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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation

]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ;
vs.

Case No. 940350 CA

]I

ERNIE YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ERNIE YOUNG

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Ernie Young appeals from a decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County.

Young appeals the Circuit

Court's class B Misdemeanor conviction of battery, in violation
of Salt Lake City Code, section 11-08-020. This Court has
jurisdiction over Young's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
section 77-18a-l(l)(a) and section 78-2a-3(2)(d).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue

-1-

1. Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel
which fell below the standard to be expected in the Salt Lake
legal community?
2.

Did this ineffective assistance of counsel result in

prejudice to appellant?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
defendant must first show that counsel rendered a deficient
performance that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Second, it must be

shown that counsels

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.

Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The following statutory provisions are determinative in this
appeal:
United States Constitution amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I-

Nature Of The Case
Appellant/defendant, Ernie Young was charged by the Salt
-2-

Lake City Attorney with one count of Battery, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Salt Lake City Code, Section 11-08020.

It was alleged that Karen Cadmen, appellant's live-in

girlfriend, was the victim.

II.

Appellant pleaded not guilty.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On June 20th, 1994 a jury trial was held in the Third

Circuit Court, the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding.
Appellant was found guilty by the jury.

Four days later

appellant filed an appeal alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Statement of The Facts
(Viewed in light of the verdict)
On September 27, 1993, Appellant and his girlfriend Karen
were at Karen's house making dinner together.

Appellant and

Karen began to argue about the preparation of the food. (T 27)
Karen left the house to go to her grandmother's house.

(T 27:2).

Karen testified that she was afraid that she would have a fit. (T
5)

(She later described these fits as anxiety attacks and

testified that she was under the care of Dr. Chase Peterson for
the condition. (T 35)) Appellant caught up with Karen a short
distance from their home. From across the street, Smith, the
prosecution's only witness was watching the incident. (T 12)
Smith testified that she thought appellant was beating
Karen.

(T 8)

Smith said that she changed positions and then
-3-

observed Karen on the ground with appellant kneeling over her. (T
8)

Smith called the police.

Later Smith testified that she saw

appellant hit Karen twice. (T 10)

Other important facts
Karen, the alleged victim, emphatically denied that the
assault or battery had ever occurred. (T 30)

She testified at

the trial that she argued with appellant but that appellant never
used undue force upon her person.

(T 30)

Karen described how

she sometimes has anxiety attacks and that appellant will
sometimes hold her to calm her down.

(T 36)

Smith admitted that her view was somewhat obstructed in
that she observed the alleged altercation across seven lanes of
traffic on 400 South and then about another half block away from
her position.
on the ground.

(T 15)

Smith did not know haw Karen had ended up

(T 15) When Smith finished calling the police

she saw Karen and Appellant walk in opposite directions of each
other.

(T 15-16)

When asked if Smith had seen Karen run away

from Appellant, Smith testified that Karen walked away from
Appellant.

(T 11:10)
During the City's case-in-chief the prosecutor first

called Smith and then called Officer Gross. (T 17) The
prosecutor, without any objection from defense attorney, asked
the cop to testify to statements allegedly made by Karen.

(T 20)

Gross speculated that Karen "feared1* appellant and testified that
Karen had fought with, struggled with, and was thrown to the
-4-

ground by appellant. (T 20)

He was allowed to repeat this

testimony during redirect. (T 23)
The officer did state that he failed to observe any
physical injuries or other objective signs of an altercation
about Karen's person. (T 23)
Inexplicably defense counsel adds to her client's
injury by asking the cop if he had also talked to another unnamed
bystander.

Again Officer Gross offers gross hearsay by stating

that the unidentified (and uncrossexaminable) passerby told him
that the appellant was "fighting" with Karen and that he told
appellant to "stop." (T 24)
The City called Karen as a witness.

Since she

testified that no battery had occurred the city attorney
attempted to impeach her in a most inappropriate manner.

She, in

numerous ways, tried to get Karen to testify that appellant had
engaged in specific instances of prior abuse. Throughout these
many attempts the defense counsel remained silent.

Following are

some examples of the prosecutor's efforts to obtain inadmissible
and prejudicial evidence:
"Have you been afraid of Ernie in the past." (T 27)
"What about when you get in fights with him?
usually try to work it out?"

Does he

(T 31)

"ok. Has this happened before?"

(T 31)

"When you have conflicts with Ernie is it always when
it is your problem?" (T 31)
"Have you had physical violence in your home?" (T 31)
-5-

"Have you had any kind of violence with Ernie before?"
(T 31)
"Is it your testimony that you were never afraid of
Ernie?" (T 39)
"Have you ever called the police to report a crime?"
(T 40)

Finally, after Karen"s devastating (to the city's case)
testimony, the prosecutor asked Officer Gross if, in his
experience, victims often change their testimony or their
versions of what really happened. (T 43)

Appellant's attorney

did not object to the irrelevance or the lack of foundation of
this question. (T 43)

Summary of The Argument
Because defense counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, her assistance as counsel
was ineffective.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court formulated a two-prong test to determine
whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
First, the defendant must show that trial counsel's performance
was deficient.

Second, the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
In the case at hand, defense counsel made a number of
mistakes that prejudiced the defense. In fact, since the alleged
-6-

victim herself even denied that a battery had taken place,

it is

highly likely that the jury would have found a reasonable doubt
and would have acquitted appellant.

However, the prosecution was

saved by defense counsel's numerous and disastrous errors and
omissions.
First, counsel did not adequately investigate the
underlying facts of the case.

Particularly, counsel failed to

subpoena a crucial witness, Mr. Davini, who would have testified
that Appellant did not use unlawful force against the alleged
victim.

(See police report dated 9/27/93).

Furthermore,

Appellant provided defense counsel with Davini's pertinent
information before his trial and she still failed to contact him.
(See Appellant's affidavit filed on June 8, 1994).
Second, counsel failed to subpoena an expert witness,
Karen's doctor, who would have informed the jury about Karen's
anxiety attacks and what they entail. Again, Appellant provided
defense counsel with Karen's doctor's name, address, and phone
number as early as December, 1993 and defense counsel still
failed to subpoena Karen's doctor.

(See Appellant's Affidavit in

Support of Motion to Dismiss dated December 20, 1993).
Third, although Appellant wanted to testify on his own
behalf, counsel did not allow him to testify.
Fourth, defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to
introduce extremely prejudicial hearsay statements by failing to
object to their admissability.
Fifth, defense counsel failed to object to several
-7-

instances of prosecutorial misconduct wherein the prosecutor
sought to elicit evidence that appellant had allegedly been
involved in prior domestic assault situations with Karen.
Sixth, defense counsel further prejudiced appellant's
case by introducing damaging evidence herself.
Therefore, appellant asks this Court to reverse the
conviction as there is overwhelming evidence to prove that
defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Argument

I.

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL BELOW AN
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS, THUS HER
ASSISTANCE AS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE

Because defense counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, her assistance as counsel
was ineffective.
The United States Constitution guarantees a fair trial
through the Due Process Clauses.

Specifically, it defines the

basic elements of a fair trial through several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.U.S. CONST, amend. VI.
Furthermore, the right to counsel has been held to be the right
to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson. 397
U.S. 759 (1970).
-8-

To determine whether a criminal defendant has been denied
his sixth amendment right to counsel, by reason of the
performance of counsel, he has the burden of meeting a two-prong
test.

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance

was deficient.

Second, the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Strickland v.

In particular, to satisfy the

first prong of the test, a defendant must show that counsel made
so serious a mistake that he was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.

To satisfy the

second prong of the test, the defendant must show that his
counsel's mistake prejudiced the defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687.
In the case at hand, defense counsel's critical mistakes
hurt appellant from two directions. First, she allowed the
prosecutor to introduce extremely damaging and clearly
inadmissible evidence by failing to make appropriate objections.
(In fact she helped the prosecution by offering evidence damaging
to her own client.)

Then, she further damaged her client's

chance for a fair trial by failing to obtain and introduce
evidence favorable to appellant's position.

II.
WHERE COUNSEL FAILS TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE
UNDERLYING FACTS OF A CASE, COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE
CANNOT BE VIEWED AS REASONABLE
-9-

Because counsel failed to read a police report which
supplies the information of a crucial witness, and as a
consequence, failed to issue a subpoena to the witness, counsel's
performance cannot be viewed as reasonable.

Under Utah law, if

defense counsel fails to adequately investigate the underlying
facts of a case, counsel's performance cannot be viewed as
reasonable.

State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990).

In State v. Tempiin> 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the
defendant's trial attorney failed to speak with or call as
witnesses several people who had seen the defendant and the
victim together on the date of the alleged rape.

The Supreme

Court of Utah found that because the defendant's trial counsel
did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of
procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first part of the
Strickland test had been met.

Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that because several of the
people who were not called as witnesses would have testified to
the amount of consensual physical contact between the defendant
and the alleged victim, the second prong of the Strickland test
had been met.

Id. at 188.

Likewise, in the case at hand, defendant's trial counsel
failed to adequately investigate the underlying facts of this
case.

First, defense counsel did not subpoena Davini, who would

have testified that Appellant did not use unlawful force against
Karen.

(See Appellant's affidavit filed on June 8, 1994).

Davini witnessed the alleged incident from approximately the same
-10-

distance that Amanda Smith, ("Smith") the prosecution's witness,
did.

In fact, Davini probably had a better view since he was

standing on the same side of the street where the alleged
incident took place.
report.

Davinifs information was in the police

Defense counsel could have obtained a copy from which

she would have had access

to Davini's phone number and address.

Thus, because defendant's trial counsel did not make a reasonable
investigation into obtaining Davinifs phone number and address,
the first part of the Strickland test has been met.
Second, if Davini had been called as a witness, he would
have testified as an eye witness that Appellant did not use
unlawful force against Karen.
on June 8, 1994).

(See Appellant's affidavit filed

Therefore, there is a reasonable probability

that Appellant's trial would have been different had defense
counsel adequately investigated Davini as a witness.
Nevertheless, there have been cases where the courts have
found that an investigation may not be necessary.
are distinguishable from Appellant's case.

However, they

For instance, in

State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993), following a conviction
of aggravated arson, the defendant appealed claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. The defendant claimed that his trial
counsel failed to order an investigation.

The Supreme Court of

Utah found that because defendant's original attorney had already
ordered an investigation, the new attorney did not need to order
another one as she would have found out the same information had
she performed an independent investigation.
-11-

Tyler, 850 P.2d at

1255.
Tyler is distinguishable from our case in that had the new
attorney made an independent investigation, she would have found
out nothing new.
any way.

Thus, it would not have helped the defendant in

On the other hand, Davini's testimony, as the only

other eye witness, would have posed a completely different story
to the jury had he been called to testify.

His testimony could

have caused a different outcome in our case.
Similarly, in State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590 (Utah App.
1993) the defendant claimed that his trial counsel failed to
interview and subpoena prospective defense witnesses in the
assault trial. The Court of appeals found that it was not
reasonable to expect counsel to try to locate customers who had
lunch across the street from where the events in question
happened based on the remote possibility that they saw the
incident.

Callahan, 866 P.2d at 594. Thus, the Court held that

defendant did not meet the first prong of the Strickland test and
thus, that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance.
Id. at 594.
Callahan is distinguishable from our case because in our
case, trial counsel only had to locate one crucial eye witness
whose pertinent information was accessible through a police
report.

It was not unreasonable to expect trial counsel to try

to locate a crucial eye witness whose testimony could have
changed the outcome of the case by testifying that Appellant did
not use unlawful force against the alleged victim.
-12-

Another case in which the Court of Appeals of Utah found
ineffective assistance of counsel is salt Lake City v. Grotepas,
874 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994).

In that case, the trial counsel

failed to investigate and raise a statutory defense to the
trespass charge.

Grotepas, 874 P.2d at 139. The court stated

that by reason of the oversight, the defendant had established
the first prong of the Strickland test.

Id. at 139. "In

addition, because an appropriate defense . . . instruction was
necessary to insure that the defendant received a fair trial, the
court determined that he was likely prejudiced by counsel's
mistake . . . "

Id.

Finally, the court found that there was a

reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant had counsel asserted the statutory
defense, thus satisfying the second prong of the Strickland test.

IcL.
Of equal importance, trial counsel failed to subpoena the
alleged victim's doctor even after Appellant provided her with
the doctor's name and phone number.

(See Appellant's Affidavit

in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated December 20, 1993).
Through her testimony, Karen's doctor would have informed the
jury about Karen's anxiety attacks and what they entail.
Unfortunately, because trial counsel failed to subpoena Karen's
doctor, the jury only heard the prosecution's side of the story.
Although trial counsel's failure to subpoena Karen's doctor could
be viewed as a trial tactic, taking the circumstances of this
case as a whole, a reasonable attorney would have subpoenaed
-13-

Karen's doctor in order to inform the jury about her illness and
how it could have affected an outsider's perception of the events
that took place on that day.

Because any reasonable attorney

would have subpoenaed Karen's doctor, trial counsel's performance
fell below the reasonable objective standard, thus satisfying the
first prong of the Strickland test.

Further, had the doctor

testified, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been more favorable to the defendant, satisfying the
second prong of the Strickland test.

III. DEPRIVATION OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY CANNOT
BE VIEWED AS A TRIAL TACTIC AS THE ULTIMATE DECISION
MUST REST WITH THE DEFENDANT

Because trial counsel deprived Appellant of his right to
testify even though Appellant wanted to testify in his own
behalf, she rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
In United States v. Butts, 630 F.Supp. 1145 (D. Maine 1986),
the defendant was deprived of testifying in his behalf on a
conviction of possession of a stolen credit card.

The district

court, quoting from Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Circ.
1978), stated that M[tlo deny a defendant the right to tell his
story from the stand dehumanizes the administration of justice."
United States v. Butts. 630 F.Supp. 1145. Also, the court found
that, "where the very point of a trial is to determine whether an
individual was involved in criminal activity, the testimony of
14-

the individual himself must be considered of prime importance."
Id. at 1147.
Essentially, the Court held that trial counsel's actions in
not affording the defendant the opportunity to testify, affected
the fairness of the trial process itself by resulting in the
defendant being deprived of the opportunity to testify. Butts,
630 F.Supp. at 1148. Consequently, the court found that trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.

Id. at

1149.
More specifically, the Supreme Court of Colorado in People
v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), found that "the
constitutional right to testify is so fundamental that procedural
safeguards are necessary to insure that the defendant understands
the significance of waiver of this right." Curtis, 681 P.2d at
509.
In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder of the
first degree. Curtisfs trial attorney stated that after hearing
the prosecution's case he had decided that Curtis would not
testify, and told him so. Curtis did not respond.

Curtis did

not know that the ultimate decision rested with him. Id. at 508.
The Court in Curtis also found that a trial court has a duty
to question a defendant on the record to ascertain whether waiver
of his right to testify was made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intentionally.

Curtis, 681 P.2d at 516.

Appellant would like to ask the Court to follow Colorado as
to the issue of requiring the trial court to establish, on the
-15-

record, that defendant waived his right to testify knowingly,
voluntarily, and intentionally.

In the case at hand, it is not

established anywhere on the record that Appellant waived his
right to testify in his behalf.

The trial court did not assure

itself that Appellant made an informed decision.

IV.
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTION'S
IMPROPER QUESTIONING WHICH ELICITED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE,
DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Throughout the trial defense counsel failed to object to
questions which elicited prejudicial inadmissible statements that
were either hearsay or irrelevant.

Furthermore she, herself

asked some questions which elicited damaging evidence to her own
client. Therefore her assistance as counsel was ineffective, (see
the numerous instances cataloged in the Statement of facts.)
CONTUSION
In summary, the United States Constitution, amendment VI
provides that,

r,

ln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . • to have Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."

Particularly the Constitution requires the effective

assistance of counsel.
Appellant, to be successful must first show that counselfs
performance was deficient.

Second, the appellant must show that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In the case at
-16-

hand defense counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness in that she did not adequately
investigate the case and she failed to subpoena two crucial
witnesses.
Appellant wanted to testify on his own behalf, but
counsel failed to afford him the opportunity.
Finally, there is more than enough evidence to show
that Appellant's trial counsel failed

to object to highly

prejudicial testimony thereby, in all probability, causing a
different result than should have obtained.
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests a reversal
of the decision of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this thirtieth day of November, 1994.

David L. Sanders
Attorney for Appellant
425 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, this
twenty-second day of November, 1994, to:
Virginia Ward
Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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